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"YOU HAVE TO BE INVOLVED ... TO PLAY 
A PART IN IT" 
ASSESSING KAINAI ATTITUDES ABOUT VOTING 
IN CANADIAN ELECTIONS 
YALE D. BELANGER 
The question of the right to vote can properly be regarded as an aspect of status and as a determinant 
of political influence. The general prohibition of voting privileges denied Indians the possession of 
one of the central symbols of membership in the Canadian political system.1 
-Harry Hawthorn (1967) 
The October 14 election allows the voices of over 800,000 First Nation citizens across Canada to 
be heard given the slim margin of victory in over 50 ridings in the last general election. To that end, 
the Assembly of First Nations National Chief Phil Fontaine has launched "Vote '08, Change Can't 
Wait!", a First Nations political participation and public awareness campaign to encourage voting 
among First Nations voters al1d to increase the profile of Aboriginal issues in this election. This ini-
tiative is also aimed at soliciting a clear and robust Aboriginal platform from each political party.2 
Two days prior to the federal election on 
June 28, 2004, the Lethbridge Herald ran an 
article in which the renowned Cree leader and 
former Member of Parliament Elijah Harper 
(Churchill electoral district in Manitoba, 
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-Assembly of First Nations press release (2008) 
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1993-97) publicly implored First Nations people 
in Canada to participate in the forthcoming 
vote.3 Citing the recent demographic shift 
showing a dramatic increase in the number 
of young First Nations people nationally and 
their potential ability to influence provincial 
and federal electoral results, Harper proclaimed 
that "Native people have a positive role to play 
in this process." Referring to the endemic lack 
of voter turnout in recent elections without 
offering an explanation for these trends, he 
cautioned First Nations readers that simply fol-
lowing politics from the comfort of one's home 
was meaningless. Complaining about federal 
and provincial political matters was not an 
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FIG. 1. NDP MLA (New Demoncratic Party 
Member of Legislative Assembly) Elijah Harper sits in 
the Manitoba legislature holding an eagle feather for 
spiritual strength as he continues to delay the house 
debate on the Meech Lake a~cord in Winnipeg, June 
19, 1990. Courtesy of The Canadian Press/Wayne 
Glowacki. 
option, opined Harper, echoing in his conclud-
ing comments Michel Foucault's contention 
that power is contingent and exercised in spa-
tial (political) contexts.4 Simply put, "You have 
to be involved [as a voter] ... to playa part in 
it [Canadian politics).,,5 
This study arises in response to Harper's 
comments and to provide much-needed con-
text to the limited research examining First 
Nations voting behavior. Although it might 
seem to be a straightforward question, answer-
ing why First Nations individuals resist voting 
in Canadian elections can be challenging. As 
the above epigraph suggests, Harry Hawthorn 
and his colleagues in the 1960s anticipated 
First Nations one day participating as voters in 
federal and provincial elections, their electoral 
participation considered a metric of civic 
participation symbolic of the "Indian's" emer-
gent equality. This did not occur as predicted, 
even if available statistical data show First 
Nations to be exercising their franchise right at 
rates higher than during any period since 1960, 
the year they were granted the vote. Despite 
climbing participation rates, these numbers lag 
behind mainstream Canadian society's voter 
participation rates, which in recent years have 
witnessed a steady decline. That First Nations 
eschewed voting in Canadian elections was 
by no means an epiphany, however. Since the 
1980s and early 1990s several researchers have 
described the low First Nations voter turnout 
rates as being a significant issue.6 In the mid-
1990s, Jonathon Malloy and Graham White 
observed, in an understatement, that "natives 
do not place a high priority on voting in 
Canadian elections."7 
In anticipation of a 2004 federal election 
call, Elections Canada devoted its entire 
November 2003 publication, Electoral Insight, 
to First Nations voting behavior in an attempt 
to expose the issues hindering First Nations 
electoral participation. A major theme to 
emerge from the seven essays was the federal 
and provincial governments' inability to ensure 
First Nations parliamentary and legislative rep-
resentation, in turn resulting in limited voter 
turnout. Similar concerns had been previously 
expressed by Trevor Knight, Tim Schouls, Will 
Kymlicka, and Roger Gibbins, all of whom 
emphasized restructuring federal electoral dis-
tricts to enhance First Nations parliamentary 
participation, echoing the recommendations 
of the 1992 Royal Commission on Electoral 
Reform and Party Financing and its Committee 
for Aboriginal Electoral Reform.8 The authors 
provided compelling reasons for implementing 
strategies they suggested could lead to improved 
First Nations voter turnout. It was during this 
period that several scholars began to stress 
the franchise's potential political influence 
both federally and provincially and in terms of 
fortifying First Nations' political resolve in the 
pursuit of self-government.9 
The problem, as I see it, was that none of 
these works probed the underlying reasons 
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leading to poor First Nations voter turnout. 
It was not until the publication of Election 
Canada's special edition in 2003 that specific 
theories were posited for poor First Nations 
voting turnout. Unfortunately, the proffered 
hypotheses took on a life of their own and were 
generally and uncritically accepted by scholars 
and public policymakers alike as the key drivers 
leading to First Nations voter alienation.l° 
A close reading of the available literature, 
of which Electoral Insight is the most recent 
and arguably the most significant contribution, 
suggests six key barriers to First Nations indi-
viduals voting in Canadian elections. I propose 
that these barriers offer scholars both a general 
conceptual framework to study the issues and 
an important lens through which to scrutinize 
more rigorously regional First Nations voting 
trends. This framework is needed to combat 
the increasingly prevalent notion that First 
Nations voter alienation is a universal phenom-
enon. Failure to acknowledge the cultural and 
regional forces influencing First Nations voting 
behavior homogenizes First Nations people and 
their unique socioeconomic challenges, suggest-
ing that an encompassing corrective to existing 
conditions, once developed, will become a pana-
cea. However, regional and community-based 
case studies are desperately needed in order to 
survey the dynamics of First Nations voting 
behavior rooted in rational choice, and in 
order to expand our understanding of why First 
Nations resist voting in Canadian elections. 
The first barrier is historical, specifically 
Canada's failure to grant First Nations the right 
to vote. One political scientist has suggested 
that lingering memories of Canada using 
"enfranchisement as a tool of assimilation" has 
led First Nations people to avoid participating in 
federal and provincial elections.l1 The second 
barrier is socioeconomic status. It is commonly 
accepted that First Nations people compose 
a disproportionate segment of Canada's poor, 
homeless, and transient, all undergirded by low 
postsecondary education attainment levels. 
This suggests that First Nations impoverish-
ment leads to disenfranchisement. The inabil-
ity to leave the reserve to vote also leads to 
disenfranchisement-Elections Canada data 
show that 296 polling booths were located in 
Canada's estimated 1,100 inhabited reserves 
during the 2004 election. The third barrier is 
a lack of effective communication. The Royal 
Commission on Electoral Reform and Party 
Financing, for example, highlighted "inad-
equate media coverage, insufficient availability 
of media, and a failure to provide campaign 
materials and issues in Aboriginal languages 
as being among the factors that discourage 
Aboriginal participation."12 Geographic disper-
sion is the fourth barrier. As Elections Canada 
elaborated, "There are very few electoral dis-
tricts in which Aboriginal people constitute a 
significant enough percentage of the electorate 
to wield actual influence in electoral politics."13 
The fifth barrier, which is the most popu-
lar explanation for the current lack of First 
Nations voter participation to date, is "feelings 
of exclusion ... a perceived lack of effective-
ness, the non-affirmation of group difference 
by and within electoral politics, and the 
virtual lack of a group's presence in electoral 
politics," all of which lead to political disin-
terest. Accordingly, First Nations individuals 
tend "to see themselves as distinct from other 
Canadians and as belonging to 'nations 
within'; and as nations that are not represented 
'within."'14 Two subthemes have emerged from 
this discourse. The nationalism discourse sug-
gests that First Nations choose not to vote in 
"foreign elections" and to focus their energies 
on local reserve politics. The political place-
ment discourse suggests that First Nations 
will choose when and where to exercise their 
franchise right within the Canadian polity for 
maximum political effect. 
Finally, the sixth barrier is that the fran-
chise forces "people to surrender their right to 
participate in politics by reducing the right to 
the merest gesture, the written mark, the vote 
... deployed as a tool of totalizing power, which 
everywhere defines itself as democratic and 
defines democracy by this hollow shell: the vote 
that establishes 'representative' government."15 
As such, "the vote is an abstraction; it repre-
sents the whole political speech and activity 
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of individual citizens, from whom other forms 
of political speech and activity are no longer 
required and, indeed, discouraged."16 
Russel Barsh et al. (1997) developed a 
comprehensive study to contrast First Nations 
and non-Native voting behavior in southern 
Alberta from a list of sixteen general elections 
and the 1992 Charlottetown constitutional ref-
erendum. Many of the hypotheses listed above 
were reflected in his conclusions. In particular, 
three principal interpretive themes emerged 
from the interview data, indicating that (1) 
First Nations peoples suffered from feelings of 
exclusion from Canadian society that results 
in minimal impact in federal and provincial 
elections; (2) a lack of practical and strategic 
information not only made learning about 
candidates difficult but also hampered people 
in -their ability to locate polling stations or 
electoral lists; and (3) respondents tended to 
be less optimistic about influencing federal and 
provincial elections but were confident in their 
ability to influence band council electionsP 
The aforementioned studies constitute the 
canon of academic literature exploring why 
First Nations people resist participating in 
federal and provincial elections. Noticeably 
little has changed in the decade since Barsh's 
rarely cited study. As a result, our understand-
ing of First Nations participation in Canadian 
electoral politics is at best limited. While 
government data detailing First Nations voter 
participation rates are informative, the issue of 
why First Nations people resist voting in federal 
and provincial elections is of primary concern. 
With these issues in mind, this exploratory 
study seeks to help answer the question why 
Kainai individuals aged twenty to twenty-nine 
resist voting in provincial and federal elec-
tions. While building on previous scholarship, 
this research is also intended to provide the 
additional baseline data needed to develop 
more extensive comparative research into First 
Nations voting behavior in external and band 
council elections in southern Alberta.Is It also 
identifies several factors that ultimately hinder 
Kainai voting participation in Canadian elec-
tions. 
COLLECTING DATA ON FIRST NATIONS 
PEOPLE 
A distinctive feature of this study is that the 
results are based upon the views and attitudes 
of First Nations people, specifically members of 
the Kainai First Nation of southern Alberta. 
The intention from the beginning was to gain 
a First Nations perspective on the interests, 
preferences, and factors that led Kainai indi-
viduals to decide on behalf of or against voting 
in Canadian elections. The Kainai First Nation 
was chosen for several reasons. One, it was 
the site of a previous study examining reserve 
members' electoral participation, thereby per-
mitting comparative analyses. Second, recent 
band elections demonstrated impressive voter 
participation rates, trends that appeared to 
be at odds with circulating anecdotes suggest-
ing that young Kainai individuals altogether 
eschew voting. Finally, all three research assis-
tants (1 male, 2 females) resided at Kainai and 
had previous experience working with youths 
and elders. Two were selected as interviewers 
to foster internal validity and to guide the proj-
ect's development and implementation, while 
the third assisted in developing the literature 
review and thematic analysis. Informant par-
ticipation was limited to English-speaking 
reserve residents in an effort to generate a 
community-based perspective chronicling why 
Kainai individuals generally avoid voting in 
off-reserve elections. 
Following University of Lethbridge ethics 
approval to conduct research with human sub-
jects, the research assistants by word of mouth 
snowballed a sample of thirty potential project 
participants who were then interviewed to 
determine project compatibility (e.g., available 
for followup interviews; willing to engage the 
interviewers; thought the issue was important, 
etc.). A final list of twenty participants was cre-
ated from the preliminary interview responses. 
The age group twenty to twenty-nine was 
selected based on overall age characteristics 
that showed this group to be one of the larg-
est and fastest growing cohorts amongst the 
general reserve population. Individuals in this 
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age group also represent the first generation of 
students to be taught in community schools 
controlled and operated exclusively by First 
Nations. Each of the participants {all grade 12 
graduates} had been exposed to the same cur-
riculum and in most cases had been taught by 
the same teachers. 
These individuals were also in the founda-
tional stages of determining, in general, how 
they would serve the community politically, 
and specifically, how their political choices 
could potentially impact their families. The 
participants also demonstrated little knowl-
edge of Canadian federal and provincial 
politics. Interestingly, most considered voting 
an important responsibility even if they did 
not precisely understand what it represented 
for them, personally. The cohort's collective 
employment rates and educational attainment 
levels reflected general community standards 
based on data available from Statistics Canada. 
In all, the cohort of ten men and ten women 
was considered statistically representative of 
the Kainai First Nations citizenry aged twenty 
to twenty-nine. 
Subsequent to the selection process, a 
follow-up interview was conducted to inform 
each participant of their rights and responsi-
bilities, to build trust, and to collect data such 
as the participant's age, current home and life 
situation, and employment and educational 
status, to name a few fields of inquiry. The 
personal interview represented the second 
stage of the data-gathering phase. For this stage 
the research team agreed that the appropri-
ate research model was the person-centered 
interview, an exploratory, discussion-based 
method designed to "clarify the relations of 
individuality, both as output and input, to its 
sociocultural context" while eliciting behaviors 
and attitudes that suggest "hidden or latent 
dimensions of the organization of persons and 
of the sociocultural matrix and their interac-
tions."19 This was an appropriate model, as the 
participants were comfortable engaging the 
research assistant{s} in conversation. 
The interviews followed a general format 
whereby the researcher engaged the partici-
pant in a discussion while subtly posing, in no 
particular order, a number of predetermined 
questions designed to keep the interviewer 
attuned to the major themes being investigated 
while eliciting the participants' stories. Such 
stories, in this instance, provide insight into 
personal decision-making.2o Ferrier has argued 
that "knowledge is constructed by people and 
groups of people; reality is multiperspectival; 
truth is grounded in everyday life and social 
relations; life is a text but thinking is an inter-
pretative act; facts and values are inseparable; 
and science and all other human activities are 
value-Iaden."21 The person-centered interview 
enabled the researchers to become further 
grounded in the context of social interface 
that led to the development of both cultur-
ally {Kainai} and regionally {reserve} specific 
meanings for voting.22 
For the research's final phase a thematic 
analysis was produced to draw themes central 
to Kainai voting behavior through "careful 
reading and re-reading of the data."23 In each 
section the voices of the participants are uti-
lized to allow those individuals to "tell the 
story," as it were, of the issues and concerns 
influencing their voting behavior. The coding 
process involved identifying an important 
comment or interview moment prior to pro-
ceeding with data interpretation. 24 Encoding 
enabled the organization and categorization of 
data from which central themes were identified 
and developed.2s Data collection and analysis 
proceeded simultaneously, and transcripts 
were r~read to ensure accuracy and thematic 
applicability to the original data. To express 
our appreciation for the time provided and 
to honor the knowledge made available to 
us, each participant was provided with a fifty-
dollar honorarium. 
THE POLITICAL SETTING 
Located in southern Alberta, the Kainai 
First Nation is situated on the Blood Reserve. 
At 881 square kilometers, it is Canada's larg-
est geographic reserve, boasting a population 
in excess of 10,000. A member nation of the 
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BLOOD INDIAN RESERVE 
ALLEGED CLAIM AREA 
MOUN'TA1N RANGE 
Ca.adi 
FIG. 2. Map representing historical and actual 
boundaries of the Blood Indian' Reserve in southern 
Alberta, 1999. Created for Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada (INAC), Negotiations Group, Specific 
Claims. Courtesy of Public Works and Government 
Services Canada (PWGSC) for Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada (INAC). [http://geoportail-geoportal. 
ainc-inac.gc.ca/mp-prd/lnd-03 _e.htmll 
Blackfoot Confederacy, the Kainai originally 
organized into small bands typically no larger 
than thirty people. 26 Prior to their mid-
eighteenth-century acquisition of the horse, 
the Kainai traversed their territory on foot, a 
period of limited mobility known as the "dog 
days," which was followed by the development 
of more efficient hunting techniques and the 
expansion of Kainai territorial claims.27 Soon 
the Kainai were positioned as a preeminent 
military power in the northwestern region of 
the Plains.28 Kainai political processes stressed 
that individuals maintain close relationships 
in the community. Many political scientists 
present tribal societies like the Kainai as dem-
onstrating "little or no specialized structure of 
government" and that with the appearance of 
non-Natives, "indigenous cultures were largely 
exterminated or pushed aside."29 Countering 
this position is a growing literature base dem-
onstrating political complexity among North 
American indigenous cultures, even if the 
Kainai's political and social experiences did not 
permit their leaders to "conceive of authority 
in European-western terms" prior to European 
contact.30 Defined communally, all functions 
of Kainai tribal government were ruled over by 
the collective. Here, self-interest could not be 
separated from tribal good-they were inextri-
cably intertwined and virtually identicaPl To 
achieve rank, one needed to gain community 
respect through reputation building based 
upon acts of bravery, for wisdom and discretion, 
by becoming an object of admiration, in sum 
by interacting closely, positively and often with 
neighbors and family. 
Following extended contact the Kainai 
pressured the British Crown for a treaty, a 
nation-to-nation pact establishing the rules 
needed to guide both Indian-Crown relations 
and territory-sharing provisions.32 Specifically, 
the depletion of the buffalo significantly chal-
lenged the Kainai's regional political and mili-
tary supremacy, leading to treaty negotiations 
in September 1877. In return for annuities 
and the Crown's promise to protect the last 
remaining buffalo herds and create sheltered 
reserves, the Kainai and Treaty 7 signatories 
ceded 54,000 square kilometers of modern-day 
southern Alberta to facilitate settler migration. 
Unbeknownst to Kainai leaders anticipat-
ing that previous treaty assurances regarding 
their continued right to self-govern would be 
honored, the Crown strictly adhered to an 
assimilation policy envisioning Indian absorp-
tion into Canadian society. Legislation such 
as the Indian Act (1876) was established to 
assist implementing assimilation;33 residential 
schools were created to instruct First Nations 
children in Canadian cultural norms;34 and 
reserves established to segregate First Nations 
from Canadian society's ills all the while 
simultaneously promoting their incorporation 
into that society.35 In particular, the Indian 
Act provided for the administration of three 
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key areas: allocation of reserve lands, defin-
ing Indian status, and granting powers of 
enforcement to the Canadian government. 
Provisions within the Indian Act forced an 
end to traditional governance and replaced it 
with municipal-style models overseen by local 
Indian agents empowered to enforce provisions 
outlawing traditional and hereditary leadership 
selection processes. 
The most debilitating challenge to sustain-
ing traditional Kainai governance came in 
the form of the Department of Indian Affairs 
(DIA), established in 1880, the country's cen-
tral bureaucracy responsible for the day-to-day 
activities and political processes of reserve 
communities. The superintendent general of 
the DIA, determined to enforce the imposition 
of the elective band council model (est. 1871), 
consequently deprived traditional leaders of 
political recognition by acknowledging only 
those individuals elected according to the 
Indian Act criteria. The goal was to transform 
hereditary leadership models into more palat-
able municipal-style councils "intended to serve 
as a pliable instrument that would advance the 
general aims of federal tutelage and support 
the particular day-to-day objectives of field 
officers."36 Presented as a voluntary process, 
few bands adopted this foreign electoral model, 
maintaining allegiance to traditional leader-
ship selection procedures. Those who chose the 
electoral model nevertheless found Canadian 
officials disinclined to personally interact with 
their leadership. From a federal perspective, the 
most direct means available to oppose federal 
plans was to participate in council meetings 
and by voting for the candidate believed best 
suited to deal with federal officials. 
First Nations resistance compelled federal 
officials to implement the Indian Advancement 
Act (1884) that aggressively championed 
Indian assimilation by once again confer-
ring certain privileges to bands considered 
adequately advancing to a more civilized status. 
The Advancement Act promoted training 
local leaders for municipal responsibilities and 
providing those responsible for guiding the 
elected band council with the authority to 
levy taxes. The council was further empow-
ered to manage policing and public health 
matters. Most reserves refused to comply and 
the Canadian government again responded. 
In 1895 the Indian Act was amended, provid-
ing Indian agents and DIA officials with the 
sweeping authority needed to oust traditional 
leaders who had been elected to band council 
but who had since been deemed unfit for politi-
cal office by the Indian agent. Once ousted 
from power, these individuals were considered 
ineligible by law to run in future elections or 
hold band council positions. 
Despite what could be considered a ques-
tionable federal policy and legislative orienta-
tion, the Kainai demonstrated a willingness 
to engage with and participate in Canadian 
society. As part of its Treaty 7 obligations to 
the Crown, the Kainai permitted unfettered 
access to their traditional lands, thereby 
fulfilling a promise to open their territory to 
settlers wishing to share the country with its 
original inhabitants.37 Following the buffalo 
hunting economy's failure in 1879, the Kainai 
quickly and successfully adopted farming and 
ranching. As part of the regional southern 
Alberta agrarian economy, reserve farming and 
ranching flourished into the early 1920s, their 
ultimate failure tied to bureaucratic ineptitude 
and malevolence.38 Striking volunteer ism in 
the Great War (1914-18) and World War II 
(1939-45) occurred. Confirming the Kainai's 
willingness to assist mainstream Canadian 
society was the leadership's decision to grant 
military access to the Blood Reserve in 1941, 
thereby permitting the Canadian Forces to 
establish a 50,000-acre bombing and gunnery 
range that took up approximately one-seventh 
of the reserve land base.39 In 1956 the com-
munity once again chose to negotiate in good 
faith with Canadian officials, granting access 
to 1,550 acres of reserve land that enabled the 
successful expansion of the St. Mary's River 
Irrigation District and the flow of much-needed 
water to southern Alberta's drought-stricken 
farmers and ranchers.4o 
This participation, however, did not extend 
to voting in Canadian elections, despite John 
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G. Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservatives 
granting Indians the franchise in 1960. Indians 
were previously barred from voting due to a 
perceived lack of civilized status, privileges 
such as treaty rights inaccessible to mainstream 
Canadians, a lack of fee simple landholdings, 
and sovereign assertions not befitting Canadian 
citizens.41 Diefenbaker ensured people that the 
Indian vote in federal and provincial elections 
would not compromise their status or make 
this participation contingent on "complete 
assimilation into Canadian society.''42 Despite 
these assurances, Barsh et al. concluded that 
voter participation among the Blood (Kainai) 
and Peigan (Piikuni) of southern Alberta was 
limited, albeit higher in federal than provin-
cial elections. However, the number of people 
voting dropped consistently over a fifteen-
year period beginning in 1980 that has yet to 
recover at the Kainai First Nation.43 Outside 
Barsh's work, little in the way of reliable statis-
tical data articulating southern Alberta First 
Nations voter participatiQn rates and voting 
trends exists for the 1960s, '70s, and '80s. 
National research conducted by Elections 
Canada showed First Nations voter participa-
tion rates in the 2000 federal election ranged 
from 35.3 percent in Quebec to 66.9 percent 
in Prince Edward Island, with Alberta listed 
at 53.9 percent.44 The lack of specific data and 
their reliability can be attributed to what one 
academic described as the "virtual absence 
of electoral districts where Aboriginal people 
represent the majority of voters.''45 A similar 
study found First Nations turnout for the 
Charlottetown referendum in 1992 was 41 per-
cent, with 38 percent and 40 percent partici-
pating in the 1993 and 1997 federal elections, 
respectively. Mainstream voter participation 
rates of 71.8 percent for the referendum and 
69.9 percent and 67 percent for the two elec-
tions suggest that the majority of First Nations 
tend to avoid voting in Canadian elections.46 
In their research examining status and 
nonstatus Indian voter turnout for federal, pro-
vincial, and band elections in New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island between 
1962 and 1993, David Bedford and the late 
Sidney Pobihushchy discovered substantial 
voter participation in band council elections 
in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia between 
1972 and 1992 and notably lower participation 
in federal elections in both provinces during 
the same time period. Their work revealed First 
Nations voter participation in New Brunswick 
and Nova Scotia band coulIcil elections (1972-
92) hovered in the 90 percent range while par-
ticipation in federal elections in both provinces 
ranged from 17.8 and 54 percent, respectively, 
to 27.6 and 45.2 percent, respectively, for pro-
vincial elections.47 Bedford later showed New 
Brunswick First Nations people engaging as 
voters, with 70 percent participating in the 
1962 federal election.48 Nevertheless, that 
number had dropped to 17.7 percent by 1988, 
with corresponding trends for provincial elec-
tions. Finally, he also found Nova Scotia First 
Nations participation in both provincial and 
federal elections to remain fairly consistent 
during the same study period. 
Notwithstanding the right to vote, which 
provides an avenue enabling an individual's 
civic participation and political influence, 
First Nations voter participation rates lag. The 
question as to why this persists is significant, 
especially in light of three key points. One, the 
move toward securing treaty rights continues 
to be undermined by the federal government's 
limited interpretation of these rights, which 
arguably limits First Nations political capacity. 
Two, the disputed Aboriginal self-government 
process currently proceeds at a snail's pace, with 
no real end or specific goals in sight, thereby 
challenging First Nations desires to engage the 
Canadian government in a nation-to-nation 
relationship.49 Third, current demographic 
trends highlight the fact that First Nations 
will comprise an ever-increasing segment of 
the Canadian population, suggesting that if 
effectively utilized the vote could be employed 
in key regions to ensure First Nations political 
representation and parliamentary influence.50 
The Kainai voter survey offers insight as to why 
the vote is viewed with suspicion despite its 
publicized potential to improve First Nations 
political participation in Canadian society. 
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THE KAINAI FIRST NATIONS VOTER SURVEY 
Interviewing for this project took place 
starting in November 2005 prior to the Kainai 
Band Council election. To provide context, 51 
percent of eligible voters in the Kainai First 
Nation participated in selecting a chief and 
twelve councillors from a potential field of 115 
candidates (one out of every 100 citizens on 
reserve ran for council). Albeit 4 percent lower 
than the 2001 elections, band election voter 
participation far outstripped the 13 percent 
Kainai First Nation turnout rate in the 2004 
federal election and the estimated one-quarter 
participation in the provincial election. 51 
This survey interviewed people at length to 
determine the thought process leading to their 
decision to vote or not to vote and to assess the 
six conceptual barriers to First Nations voting 
participation previously outlined. As discussed 
below, the participants at times both validated 
and contradicted the barriers to voting out-
lined above while presenting four additional 
themes/hypothesis detailed below that improve 
our collective understanding of why Kainai 
individuals resist voting in Canadian elec-
tions. 
THE PERSONAL ASPECT OF POLITICS 
The Kainai historically embraced a politi-
cal model characterized by an absence of 
power relations {coercive, hierarchical, and 
authoritative).52 Maintaining relationships 
was stressed and aggressive political competi-
tion among individuals avoided. Folks were 
taught to govern their own personal affairs 
in communities where no individual had the 
right to govern another. Leadership skills were 
seen as gifts derived from the Creator and 
fostered in communities where responsibilities 
to the community were stressed rather than 
becoming "a claimant of rights.,,53 A complex 
network of relationships evolved that guided 
all functions of government conducted by the 
people who were responsible for the day-to-day 
governance. 54 Importantly, those considered to 
be commanding or overbearing were rejected, 
making it possible for leaders to achieve rank 
only by gaining respect through reputation-
building based upon acts of bravery, wisdom, 
and discretion, in essence by becoming an 
object of admiration. 55 This check was devised 
to avoid power becoming concentrated in one 
or a handful of individuals. In sum, individuals 
demonstrating knowledge and experience were 
viewed as leaders in communities where lobby-
ing for leadership positions through structured 
voting procedures was shunned. 
The loss of this previously intimate and per-
sonal political process was identified as prob-
lematic by all project respondents, in particular 
the lack of personal interaction with political 
candidates. All suggested that such behavior 
reflected a lack of interest in First Nations 
affairs at best, and at worst the belief that 
politicians held disdain for First Nations people 
and their concerns. Leadership selection was 
presented as an important responsibility not 
to be taken lightly. One twenty-eight-year-
old male concluded, "I see the significance of 
voting in both [federal and provincial elec-
tions] because, you know, I'm getting older and 
a lot of stuff is going to be affecting me now. It 
affects everyday life and the people that do get 
elected in, you know, you've got to know what 
they stand for."56 Federal and provincial candi-
dates' refusal to visit the reserve to speak to one 
individual about the issues or to engage him 
as a political equal kept this individual from 
voting in Canadian elections.57 It also forced 
one twenty-six-year-old male to reference the 
print media and television for his informa-
tion. Television in particular was cited by most 
informants (n = 16) as an essential political 
tool needed to forge a general sense of personal 
interface with politicians. This was required, as 
the latter informant suggested, before a voter 
can "really see and understand politicians." 
Television was considered the best medium 
available for participants to scrutinize political 
candidates and to read their body language, 
which was considered central in assisting 
individuals in making an informed decision. 
Elaborating on this point, a twenty-something 
female stated "I guess if I see the person and 
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. . . go hear them talking . . . and if I think 
they are sincere" simply by watching how they 
handle themselves in public makes easier the 
task of selecting a candidate. Interestingly, and 
reflecting the majority of respondents (n = 15), 
she assumed that politicians "wouldn't lie."58 
This is not surprising, for historically lying 
or misrepresenting oneself or your family in a 
small First Nations community would quickly 
be discovered and the individual shamed. 
Regaining the trust of neighbors was an oner-
ous task. Maintaining community balance 
was the key; hence, lying was objectionable 
and something that political leaders did not 
practice. 59 Although a handful of respondents 
(n = 6) were concerned that certain politicians 
had been exposed as lying to their constituents, 
the majority overwhelmingly believed that 
politicians dealt truthfully with the media. 
One twenty-eight-year-old male concluded 
that politicians are like an open book-if they 
are lying and "you really want to know about 
them" you can simply "go online and ... just 
research it." Personally knowing a politician 
made candidate selection easier, for according 
to one twenty-two-year-old female, this would 
allow you to become more familiar with "what 
kind of job they do, what kind of person they 
are, what kind of experience they have." She 
concluded, "If I know their experiences ... 
that is how I would pick them.,,60 Each indi-
vidual emphasized the need for interaction 
with candidates to find out the truth. This, all 
suggested, could be done by attending politi-
cal forums and posing tough political ques-
tions to the candidates. At that point, adds a 
twenty-six-year-old male, "you can tell a guy is 
lying."61 
Personal interface with political candidates 
was also considered an important educational 
tool, one that most participants (n = 15) 
claimed would help them surmount a lack of 
education about the Canadian political system. 
This was considered the most effective means 
available to potential voters seeking a quick 
education about the issues.62 In communities 
that still embrace storytelling to convey social 
norms and mores, this response should not 
be surprising. What are difficult to overcome 
are the feelings of intimidation associated 
with voting, which is further exacerbated by 
a limited knowledge of Canadian federal and 
provincial politics. This often dissuaded people 
from exercising the franchise, according to 
a twenty-seven-year-old male: "I just think 
that people ... are scared to [get involved]. 
They don't know what they are like, [they 
lack] influence." He concluded, "I think just 
a lot more Natives should be voting and get-
ting into politics.,,63 One twenty-one-year-old 
male suggested that some people "don't have 
enough knowledge on who to vote for, who is 
who, and they kind of don't really understand. 
It is kind of hard for them to vote for anybody; 
what if they vote for the wrong person?"64 A 
twenty-nine-year-old female indicated that the 
complexity of federal and provincial Indian 
policies is difficult to discern and that further 
education would make the act of voting "more 
meaningful.,,65 
A minority (n = 7) of the respondents 
indicated that feelings of political and cultural 
disassociation resulted, causing one twenty-six-
year-old female to conclude, "I just really don't 
see the relevance of all that, because ... I don't 
really feel connected," while adding that the 
lack of communication and personal education 
makes voting "just a big headache."66 Similarly, 
a twenty-six-year-old male, referring to the 
Canadian political system, concluded, "I don't 
understand it and it doesn't really involve me 
and my family, my kids. It wouldn't be right for 
me to vote, because I don't understand. I'm not 
gonna waste any body else's time." 
DISCERNING GOSSIP FROM FACT 
The Committee for Aboriginal Electoral 
Reform concluded in 1991 that First Nations 
lacked the information needed to exercise 
rational choice, thereby implicitly barring 
them from effectively participating as voters. 
However, the recent proliferation of television, 
radio, and especially the Internet means that 
folks at the Blood Reserve are impressively 
connected to nonreserve media sources.67 The 
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issue is not so much whether people are con-
nected, which they are, but rather how people 
utilize this information to best determine suit-
able candidates. In this instance two avenues 
of research were regularly pursued to assist 
respondents to become more informed about 
the issues: (1) discussion with family members 
and friends and (2) employing the media as a 
reliable agent of fact. Participants employed 
the two methods in a mutually supporting 
fashion to acquire knowledge they believed 
would allow them to make an educated deci-
sion about provincial and federal candidates. 
Word of mouth was most often utilized, given 
the variety of available media on reserve that 
frequently offered contradictory commentary. 
This often-confusing punditry led to increased 
personal interface with neighbors and relatives 
that most often took the form of informal face-
to-face discussions and e-mail and Internet 
chat-room debates. Nevertheless, the media, 
including local and national print media, radio, 
and television, are considered reliable agents of 
fact. 
When asked how she knew the information 
she obtained about a particular candidate was 
accurate a twenty-four-year-old female replied, 
if the "person said it to a national newspaper 
... and they have the nerve to publish it ... 
obviously it's true." Lethbridge residents rely 
upon media information to help them in the 
decision-making process in much the same way 
project participants suggested existing media 
outlets assist their voting choices. Many infor-
mants (n = 6) regularly access the Lethbridge 
Herald, the Globe and Mail, and the National 
Post either online or by purchasing the paper 
during elections. Many more (n = 13) watched 
the local and national television newscasts or 
tuned into the local radio station (CFWE 89.9 
FM) for news updates. The majority (n = 13), 
including a twenty-four-year-old male, indi-
cated that the mass media assisted them in the 
decision-making process. He stated, "It kind of 
makes you think about which party you want 
to vote for. They state their thing ... they are 
telling you what they are going to do, what 
they are planning, how they are going to try to 
campaign to win the votes. It gives you a good 
idea of who you want to vote for." An interest-
ing tension exists concerning the participants' 
outright acceptance of media interpretations 
as truthful statements. For instance, a twenty-
eight-year-old male stated that in addition to 
word of mouth, the Internet is his main source 
of information: "I try to talk to a lot of people; 
you try not to take everything as truth. You 
just have to research for yourself. You trust 
your friendships as well." With the Internet he 
was able to read relevant articles and forward 
them to his friends if he believed the writings 
"important enough." 
Perhaps most telling was the study par-
ticipants' methodology for separating fact from 
gossip. While seeking out advice from family 
members was cited as an important educational 
tool, a twenty-four-year-old female indicated 
that she was unable to determine how her 
family members separated gossip from fact. 
Despite being inundated with negative cam-
paigning, one informant refused to accept the 
impossibility of positive outcomes. Alluding to 
the import of remaining personally connected 
to political candidates, a twenty-seven-year-old 
male suggested that differentiating gossip from 
fact is possible if you take the time to listen to 
others. A limited majority (n = 12) claimed 
that this was in fact a difficult proposition, 
made all the more challenging when you con-
sider that "there is always truth behind some 
things because why would they be talking 
about it if it's not there? You know that there 
is something going on but you don't know what 
it is.".68 Added a twenty-four-year-old female, 
"Sometimes I think it's just pretty much 
all gossip," elaborating that word-of-mouth 
information does not help her in her decision-
making process because "a lot of times you will 
hear someone say something to somebody and 
then sometimes you will hear something else 
and the story's totally changed." 
Notwithstanding the importance placed 
on engaging neighbours and relatives, Kainai 
society was and remains a highly individualis-
tic environment where individuals are encour-
aged to formulate decisions upon acquiring 
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the requisite information. This helps those 
who have difficulty discerning gossip from 
fact. For instance, a twenty-two-year-old male 
suggested that "everyone has their own opin-
ion" and that he "can't really decide" what is 
gossip. He did admit though that referencing 
numerous information sites assisted him in 
his decision-making process.69 Stressing the 
need to establish interactive relationships with 
political candidates, a twenty-eight-year-old 
male suggested that separating gossip from 
fact would be easier if federal and provincial 
politicians visited the reserve in order to speak 
with community members, "because it's not 
like they are at your fingertips, you can't really 
go to a person and say, 'What do you believe'?" 
He explained that by accepting word-of-mouth 
information uncritically is "kind of like feeding 
the monster." He added that "you hear it all the 
time. The parents say this guy did that, and this 
guy did this. You hear it all the time." However, 
a female informant indicated that she tried 
to separate herself from that process "because 
they say bad things about 'people [and] I kind 
of wonder what their motivation is. Is it to do 
something for themselves or to do something 
good for the community?"70 Yet she wondered 
whether this benefited her candidate selection 
process. "I look at the kinds of jobs they have 
and what their status is in the community and 
how they are actively involved," which "makes 
it easier for me. As long as they're educated and 
you know they are not just doing it for them-
selves, but for the community." In sum, there 
exists no bona fide mechanism beyond word 
of mouth that permits people to discern gossip 
from accurate assertions of fact. 
KAINAI POLITICS TAKE PRECEDENCE 
Four distinctive political groups comprised 
the Blackfoot Confederacy: the South Piikuni, 
the North Piikuni, the Siksika, and the Kainai. 
Historically, these four nations would meet 
annually for the Sun Dance, where ceremo-
nies were performed and family and political 
ties renewed. Political and economic councils 
were held where leaders of the four nations 
debated regional matters and formulated reso-
lutions. Whereas larger confederacy concerns 
dominated the debates, Kainai issues were also 
discussed, as local leaders never lost sight of the 
importance of resolving their concernsJI After 
the celebration the smaller Kainai bands would 
disperse to their traditional territories and for 
the rest of the year would self-govern. The 
political model was interactive and allowed for 
Kainai issues to take precedence as opposed to 
deferring to the larger confederacy structureJ2 
That being said, the Kainai have always dem-
onstrated a proclivity for focusing on internal 
matters to the detriment of maintaining exter-
nal alliancesP 
Not surprisingly, the participants who were 
most critical of the federal and provincial 
governments demonstrated less inclination 
to vote. These individuals stated that reserve 
politics were their primary concerns, with all 
outside political issues remaining peripheral. 
A twenty-four-year-old male indicated that 
he had "never known too many people to 
vote in a Federal election" because they were 
"more concerned about their own reserve," 
where life is lived and local decisions are felt 
and experienced. In his opinion, limited com-
munity participation in provincial elections 
resulted. He further hypothesized that reserve 
residents would "rather get things straightened 
out on their own reserve before they move to 
other things." Supporting this conclusion was 
a twenty-one-year-old male who stated "with 
the Native people, we are more focused on our 
needs, on our reserves for our people, than out 
in the world . . . off the reserve." A twenty-
six-year-old female commented, "I think it's 
because I live on the reserve, but everything 
that has to be done out there [affects] me 
directly because I'm living in a house that 
needs this done ... and I'm driving on the 
roads that need this done." 
Reserve residents were inherently more 
aware of the community's political issues, 
and voting in reserve elections was thus pre-
sented as less imposing than participating in 
larger Canadian elections due to an improved 
understanding of the key political issues. It was 
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also presented as each community member's 
responsibility. This did not militate against 
becoming educated about and participating in 
Canadian elections. A twenty-three-year-old 
woman, for instance, concluded that while she 
was "more aware of voting on the reserve than 
what was going on" provincially and federally, 
additional education about the issues "being 
brought up regarding Natives" was needed. 
In return, "Natives should vote more so their 
voice could be heard."74 
Even so, "Our politics are the reserve," one 
twenty-eight-year-old male concluded, adding 
that "no one looks outside the reserve because 
their help is to mainly focus on our reserve." 
The interviewers, however, sensed that most of 
the participants were contemplating becoming 
more informed about and eventually involved 
in federal and provincial politics. Participating 
in band elections was considered by several 
(n = 6) to be a gateway to this anticipated par-
ticipation. Previous experience voting in band 
elections also provided a handful of others 
(n = 4) with a sense that one person can impact 
the outcome of an election. As confirmed by a 
twenty-four-year-old female, any person "could 
have a deciding vote." The concern of most 
participants was summed up by a twenty-eight-
year-old male: "We don't know what is going 
on, on the outside [of the reserve]." Another 
lamented that his family and friends may 
choose to vote in Canadian elections due to 
the fact that "people are just growing conscious 
of the situation that Natives are restricted to," 
and that casting a ballot was but one of a lim-
ited number of options available to reserve resi-
dents seeking to foster positive socioeconomic 
change.15 If indeed the vote is seen as a last-ditch 
effort to improve reserve conditions, this will 
demand that voters improve their knowledge 
of political candidates, since these candidates 
"have our interests [integrated into] their politi-
cal platform, [and] those are the type of people 
that I want to vote for."76 According to one 
respondent, this is the means to secure political 
voice for First Nations people in Canada: "It's 
our responsibility to do that."77 A twenty-four-
year-old female proposed establishing a regional, 
southern Alberta First Nations party "that has 
just as much influence as even if it was just the 
basic Native population. We could have people 
over there that protect our rights." 
Clearly, reserve politics take precedence 
over other political issues, although it was once 
again suggested that sending federal and pro-
vincial political representatives to the reserve 
for educational purposes would likely lead to 
increased voter participation. Two points are 
highlighted here. First, project participants 
wanted outside political candidates to become 
aware of local political issues. Second, the 
complexity of the Canadian political process 
was again highlighted; specifically the local 
(some might say myopic) focus on reserve poli-
tics is often to the detriment of understanding 
regional and national political issues and how 
they may impact the community. A twenty-six-
year-old male indicated that he would be more 
willing to vote if he was able to learn about 
Canadian politics while simultaneously teach-
ing political candidates about important reserve 
issues. One twenty-nine-year-old female went 
so far as to suggest that she would be willing to 
seriously consider voting for any party willing 
to visit the reserve to see firsthand how federal 
and, to a lesser extent, provincial policy deci-
sions directly impact First Nations people. She 
added that while it would be overly optimistic 
to suggest that conditions would straightaway 
improve, it would nevertheless provide political 
candidates with a showcase of current living 
conditions to impress upon them that their 
efforts in improving their understanding of First 
Nations people would be rewarded. A twenty-
six-year-old male agreed, adding that should 
politicians visit reserve communities, they could 
see firsthand what was "happening, and then 
they could really truly see what the living 
conditions are, and how the Indians live on 
the reserve, and see the areas that we actually 
need help on." Only when they see the "living 
situations for some people" will federal and 
provincial politicians and political candidates 
understand "why some people don't really care 
about them" and their specific federal and pro-
vincial political concerns.18 
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CANADIANS' PERCEPTIONS OF KAINAI 
FIRST NATION'S NEEDS 
The period following the signing of Treaty 
7 in September 1877 is characterized by the 
Kainai as one of hunger and broken promises, 
exacerbated by government attitudes equating 
the Blackfoot as little more than obstacles to 
western expansion.79 Following confederation 
in 1867, the new federal government embarked 
on an aggressive social program aimed at 
assimilating the original inhabitants of the 
land. BO This period still resonates with Kainai 
community members, as confirmed by a recent 
study examining historic and contemporary 
Blackfoot participation in the Canadian 
Forces. One informant, disturbed by what he 
considered to be "the Canadian government's 
poor treatment of returning veterans," which 
inCluded restrictions on voting in Canadian 
elections, thought that he and his communi-
ties were issues of peripheral concern to main-
stream society. In his words, they were simply 
"brushed aside."Bl 
Several participants (n = 17) still harbor 
resentment toward the Canadian government 
and are concerned that they have little access 
to the circuits of power. Yet, interestingly 
enough, many indicated (n = 14) that par-
ticipating in Canadian politics would lead to a 
sense of empowerment, thereby providing them 
with the ability to derail anti-First Nations pol-
icies prior to implementation. This unique take 
on events embraced various strategies such as 
not voting for a specific party. The latter-day 
Progressive Conservatives and the modern-day 
Conservative Party were most often mentioned 
in this context, leading one twenty-eight-year-
old male to conclude, "It is pretty well known 
that they don't want treaties any more and they 
have just said things." Party affiliations aside, 
a twenty-three-year-old female acknowledged 
the Canadian state's overarching role in First 
Nations politics, adding that it was incumbent 
upon all reserve residents to vote in federal and 
provincial elections in order to shape incom-
ing governments and mitigate the "impact they 
have on us here ... on the reserve." A twenty-
seven-year-old male claimed he needed to vote 
because failure to do so could result in his 
people's "rights being taken away." Similarly, 
a twenty-two-year-old female admitted that 
she would be willing to participate and vote 
because voting "the wrong guy in there" could 
result in the government taking "away our 
[treaty] rights." 
Those who desire voting privileges often 
find themselves unable to exercise this right 
on the reserve. Many, such as one twenty-six-
year-old male, believe that there is no access 
to voting in federal and provincial elections 
on the reserve, whereas a twenty-eight-year-old 
male stated that traveling to reserve voting 
booths is an onerous task due to the geographic 
disparity of the electorate (the Blood Reserve 
is 881 square kilometers), poor roads, and the 
lack of reliable transportation. According 
to Elections Canada, "If a polling station is 
entirely comprised of a reserve or is mostly 
comprised of a reserve, returning officers are 
instructed to establish polling stations on the 
reserve, wherever the band council will allow 
it. In such cases, the polling station is located 
at the band council office or community 
centre." In those instances where the band 
council declines, "the polling station is set up 
as close as possible to the outside boundary 
of the reserve. Aboriginal electors living off 
reserve vote at a regular polling station in the 
polling division in which they live."B2 
Recent news reports suggested that no poll-
ing booths would be situated at the Kainai 
First Nation or the neighboring Piikuni First 
Nation for the 2008 provincial election, which 
generated negative publicity about a practice 
condemned by municipal and provincial poli-
ticians alike.B3 A twenty-eight-year-old male 
was critical, questioning why more polling 
booths were not located on the reserve. He also 
expressed concern that an individual living 
in neighboring Cardston, for example, could 
potentially be voted into power without the 
reserve residents' best interests at heart. He 
added cryptically that a First Nations political 
candidate meeting with electoral success would 
likewise be forced to represent Cardston interests, 
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TABLE 1 
FIRST NATIONS, INUIT, AND METIS SENATORS 
Name Political Af:6.lation 
Hardisty, Richard Charles Conservative 
Boucher, William Albert Liberal Party of Canada 
Glastone, James Independent Conservative 
Williams, Guy R. Liberal Party of Canada 
Adams, Willie Liberal Party of Canada 
Watt, Charlie Liberal Party of Canada 
Marchand, Leonard Stephen Liberal Party of Canada 
Twinn, Walter Patrick Progressive Conservative Party 
St. Germain, Gerry Progressive Conservative Party 
Chalifoux, Thelma J. Liberal Party of Canada 
Gill, Aurelien Liberal Party of Canada 
Sibbeston, Nick G. Liberal Party of Canada 
Dyck, Lillian Eva New Democratic Party 
Lovelace Nicholas, Sandra M. Liberal Party of Canada 
a group of individuals he framed as having 
demonstrated disinterest for and antipathy 
toward the Kainai. 
The overwhelming feeling that reserve resi-
dents' needs were being ignored led a number 
of participants (n = 11) to conclude that First 
Nations parliamentary representation is lack-
ing (see Tables 1 and 2). A twenty-two-year-old 
female echoed these sentiments by suggesting 
that becoming personaliy associated "with a 
lot of the candidates" would make her "more 
inclined to try and vote if I knew they repre-
sent our interests." Another was more negative, 
characterizing politicians as uncaring due to 
their refusal to visit the reserve. A twenty-
eight-year-old male countered this commen-
tary, suggesting that even though he lacked 
an in-depth understanding of the Canadian 
political process, he was convinced that most 
federal and provincial politicians were pro-
First Nations and interested in addressing the 
issues of most concern to First Nations. With 
this in mind, he suggested that he would be 
more interested in Canadian politics "if you 
Province/Territory Date Appointed Native Origin 
[yyyy.mm.ddl 
Northwest Territories 1888.02.23 Metis 
Saskatchewan 1957.01.03 Metis 
Alberta 1958.01.31 First Nations 
British Columbia 1971.12.09 First Nations 
Northwest Territories 1977.04.05 Inuit 
Quebec 1984.01.16 Inuit 
British Columbia 1984.06.29 First Nations 
Alberta 1990-09.27 First Nations 
British Columbia 1993.06.23 Metis 
Alberta 1997.11.26 Metis 
Quebec 1998.09.17 First Nations 
Northwest Territories 1999.09.02 First Nations 
Saskatchewan 2005.03.24 First Nations 
New Brunswick 2005.09.21 First Nations 
throw in a political party just for Natives." 
Supporting this view was a twenty-three-year-
old female who indicated her willingness to 
actively participate in federal and provincial 
politics if there were more First Nations politi-
cal candidates.84 This is needed, according to 
the majority of participants (n = 17), for unless 
First Nations individuals are situated in the key 
political chambers where First Nations policies 
are crafted and implemented, the potential 
exists for all historic rights to be extinguished, 
suggesting further that "more representation 
for the Native people that ran in these elec-
tions" would make voting an easier chore.85 
THE FUTURE OF FIRST NATIONS VOTING 
Seven of the study's twenty participants pre-
viously voted in a federal or provincial election, 
or both. Two of the twelve who did not were 
too young to participate in previous elections 
but indicated their desire to do so. The remain-
ing eleven participants provided various rea-
sons for not voting which are categorized and 
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TABLE 2 
FIRST NATIONS, INUIT, AND METIS MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT 
Name Political Affilation Constituency Date Elected Native Origin 
[yyyy.mm.ddl 
McKay, Angus Conservative Marquette, Manitoba 1871.03.02 Metis 
Delorme, Pierre Conservative Provencher, Manitoba 1871.03.03 Metis 
Riel, Louis Independent Provencher, Manitoba 1873.10.13 Metis 
Boucher, William Albert Liberal Party of Canada Rosthern, Saskatchewan 1948.10.25 Metis 
Rheaume, Eugene (Gene) Progressive Conservative Party Northwest Territories 1963.04.08 Metis 
Marchand, Leonard Stephen Liberal Party of Canada Kamloops-Cariboo, 
British Columbia 
1968.06.25 Metis 
Firth, Walter (Wally) New Democratic Party Northwest Territories 1972.10.30 Metis 
Ittinuar, Peter New Democratic Party Nunatsiaq, 1979.05.22 Metis 
Northwest Territories 
Keeper, Cyril New Democratic Party Winnipeg-St. James, 1980.02.18 Metis 
Manitoba 
St. Germain, Gerry Progressive Conservative Party Mission-Port Moody, 1983.08.29 Metis 
British Columbia 
Suluk, Thomas Progressive Conservative Party Nunatsiaq, 1984.09.04 Inuit 
Northwest Territories 
Anawak, Jack Iyerak Liberal Party of Canada Nunatsiaq, 1988.11.21 Inuit 
Northwest Territories 
Blondin-Andrew, Ethel Dorothy Liberal Party of Canada Western Arctic, 
Northwest Territories 
1988.11.21 First Nations 
Littlechild, Wilton (Willie) Progressive Conservative Party Wetaskiwin, Alberta 1988.11.21 First Nations 
DeVillers, Paul Liberal Party of Canada Simcoe North, Ontario 1993.10.25 Metis 
Harper, Elijah Liberal Party of Canada Churchill, Manitoba 1993.10.25 First Nations 
O'Brien, Lawrence, D. Liberal Party of Canada Labrador, Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
1996.03.25 Metis 
Karetak-Lindell, Nancy Liberal Party of Canada Nunavut, 1997.06.02 Inuit 
Northwest Territories 
Laliberte, Rick New Democratic Party Churchill River, 1997.06.02 Metis 
Saskatchewan 
Cleary, Bernard Bloc Quebecois Louis-Saint-Laurent, Quebec 2004.06.28 First Nations 
Smith, David Liberal Party of Canada Pontiac, Quebec 2004.06.28 Metis 
Russell, Todd Norman Liberal Party of Canada Labrador, Newfoundland 2005.05.24 Metis 
and Labrador 
Bruinooge, Rod Conservative Party of Canada Winnipeg South, Manitoba 2006.01.23 Metis 
(2003) 
Keeper, Tina Liberal Party of Canada Churchill, Manitoba 2006.01.23 First Nations 
Merasty, Gary Liberal Party of Canada Desnethe-Missinippi-Churchill 2006.01.23 First Nations 
River, Saskatchewan 
Clarke, Rob Conservative Party of Canada Desnethe-Missinippi-Churchill 2008.03.17 First Nations 
(2003) River, Saskatchewan 
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outlined above. This study has highlighted that 
among the Kainai an additional four barriers 
to voter participation exist in addition to the 
six discussed. First, a sense of historical injus-
tice tied to previously being barred from voting 
can indeed serve to motivate participation in 
Canadian elections in contradiction to the 
hypothesis suggesting that past mistreatment, 
specifically being banned from voting, is an 
explanation for nonparticipation. Second, the 
lack of mainstream Canadian society's atten-
tion to First Nations does not invariably lead 
to First Nations nationalism discourses, as the 
literature suggests. Rather, a desire to partici-
pate in Canadian elections was evident, spe-
cifically among participants seeking to situate 
a candidate amendable to protecting historic 
and individually acknowledged Aboriginal and 
treaty rights. 
Third, there is clearly a desire for First 
Nations representation in mainstream Cana-
dian institutions; however, from a Kainai 
perspective this representation can be ensured 
by visits from politicians and other candidates. 
Such visits would preserve the personal aspect 
of political interface that was historically an 
important aspect of local politics, and remains 
so. When political candidates fail to engage 
Kainai residents, the Kainai turn to media cov-
erage of politics and elections as an educational 
substitute. This, however, undermines the 
desired face-to-face contact due to an increas-
ing political reliance on the media's ability to 
"get the word out," as it were. Finally, the study 
demonstrated the majority of residents foresee 
voting in Canadian elections as a means of 
improving local socioeconomic conditions. 
Nonvoting in this instance was not, as the 
literature has suggested, directly attributable 
to the limited number of voters, the perceived 
inability to make a difference, or geographic 
dispersion. 
The interview data suggest mixed results 
when measuring the six barriers to voting that 
have been presented to date as the common 
reasons resulting in First Nations voter alien-
ation. Data collected countered the hypotheses 
suggesting that First Nations people fail to vote 
due to the lingering memory of the franchise 
being utilized as an assimilation mechanism. 
The nature of the vote and its ability to alter 
the political landscape leading to refined and 
improved Aboriginal policy orientations was 
not considered to be abstract. Poor socioeco-
nomic conditions on the reserve did not act 
as a deterrent to voting, even at the Blood 
Reserve, where more than 30 percent of the 
citizenry is currently on social assistance of 
one kind or another. Participants did express a 
fear of voting, however. In order to exercise the 
franchise, one had to leave the community to 
vote in what were presented as hostile environ-
ments (Le., nonreserve communities), suggest-
ing that placing a polling booth at Standoff, 
the reserve's largest commercial center, would 
enable people vote in comfortable surround-
ings. 
Several of the six hypotheses were sup-
ported in this study. Communication remains 
an issue, especially when it comes time to 
determine when and where to vote. The 
proliferation of televisions and especially the 
Internet and the availability of home comput-
ers and community access sites now enable 
individuals to conduct quick research and stay 
abreast of current events. Discerning accurate 
information from partisan sources remains a 
concern. Community needs were unanimously 
presented as more important than regional, 
provincial, and federal politics. Yet the major-
ity of participants indicated that voting in 
Canadian elections influences policy creation; 
therefore, it influences reserve conditions. The 
nationalism discourse in this case emerges not 
as an aggressive assertion of sovereignty and/ 
or Aboriginal rights so much as a thinly veiled 
distrust of the Canadian political system and 
its potential to harm First Nations people. 
Although this study has shed light on 
individual Kainai voting behavior, little has 
changed in ten years since Barsh's study of 
southern Alberta First Nations voting par-
ticipation. Many of the same barriers to voting 
remain in place. In that time, additional obsta-
cles have emerged or are being formally articu-
lated. Interestingly, the vote is not viewed with 
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suspicion so much as its relevance to improving 
local socioeconomic conditions is questioned. 
The lack of attention currently being paid to 
this phenomenon and its potential correctives 
is troublesome but no more so than the admit-
tedly limited analyses of First Nations voting 
participation, which can be characterized as 
a reductive practice situating First Nations 
people in one of two groups: (1) First Nations 
nationalists with isolationist tendencies, or (2) 
disloyal ex-patriots who are characterized in 
a variety of ways ranging from the colloquial 
(apples) to the academic (compradors).86 
Failure to suggest that First Nations people 
in reserve communities may consider them-
selves Liberals, Conservatives, or Green Party 
members willing to discuss their interest in fed-
eral and provincial politics while still remain-
ing involved in, or at the very least informed 
about, First Nations reserve politics hampers 
our understanding of the First Nations voting 
experience. A middle ground of choice cannot 
exist if the literature accurately reflects the 
dynamics being experienced in First Nations 
communities nationally. Kainai voter par-
ticipation, specifically, and First Nations voting 
behavior, in general, are nuanced phenomena 
in need of improved academic attention. 
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